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The Budget Code 
increases the 
independence of 
local governments…
Budget Code: Decentralize and consolidate
At the beginning of July, the Verkhovna Rada adopted a new version of the Bud-
get Code, an event that made barely a ripple among Ukraine’s voters. Nor did it 
rouse the turbulent public debate and widespread opposition that the draft Tax 
Code did in June. Yet, assessments of the latest changes to Budget legislation 
were an equally mixed bag.
The new version of the Budget Code appears to completely match Viktor Yanu-
kovych’s campaign promises and to be in line with the strategic course taken by 
Party of the Regions to increase the independence of local budgets. According 
to Premier Mykola Azarov, eight national taxes and fees have been transferred 
to the local level. In addition, local governments now have the right to redistrib-
ute 25% of the state profit tax.
Still, not all local government officials are happy about the budgetary innova-
tions. The most highly criticized point is the serious restriction on the powers 
of local governments to use external borrowing as an instrument. In addition to 
already written-in requirements, caps on the size of debts and extent of guaran-
tees were added. Cities will effectively be unable to independently seek financ-
ing to undertake large-scale infrastructure projects. The old system of “bring-
ing tributes to Kyiv” offers little or no hope that municipal infrastructure will be 
modernized.
The trend towards consolidation that hides a real elimination of the democratic 
norms of separation of power has also infected Budget legislation. Yet another 
novelty in the Code is the considerable expansion of the powers of the Pres-
ident and Cabinet in the Budget process. The Budget Resolution that earlier 
was approved by the Verkhovna Rada has been changed to a Budget Declara-
tion that no longer requires approval. The President’s right to veto the Law on 
the State Budget has been changed to the option to return it for further review. 
This means that “inefficient” debate has been removed from the Budget process 
and switched for a swift and highly efficient making of decisions that cannot be 
challenged.
News of the Month
…but restricts their 
borrowing powers
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Freedom of choice
On 10 July, the Verkhovna Rada passed a new version of the Law “On the elec-
tion of deputies to the legislature of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” lo-
cal councils and village, town and local mayors.” From now on, local elections 
will be based on a majoritarian-proportional system without the participation of 
blocs of political parties. Only representatives of actual parties whose branches 
are registered in a given town, county or village for at least 12 months prior to 
the election may be nominated for office.
These changes to electoral law were a consequence of widespread public politi-
cal consensus about the ineffectiveness of the proportional system at the local 
level. Now, in addition to recognizing a political “brand,” candidates for office 
will have to demonstrate their ability to deal with the problems that concern 
their voters.
Critics accuse the authors of this new law of trying to weaken the position of 
their political rivals. Prohibiting the participation of political blocs will make 
life much more difficult for the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYT) and the Vo-
lodymyr Lytvyn Bloc (VLB), while the timeframe required for registering party 
offices and the requirement that electoral commissions be formed exclusively 
of representatives of parties that hold seats in the Verkhovna Rada severely re-
strict the options of new political forces, such as Serhiy Tihipko’s Sylna Ukraina 
[Strong Ukraine] and Arseniy Yatseniuk’s Front Zmin [Front of Changes].
Pastoral visit
The Constitution of Ukraine states that the church and the state must be sepa-
rate. Yet, neither Ukraine’s last President nor the current one has been partic-
ular about remaining outside church matters but has, on the contrary, always 
been actively engaged. Under Mr. Yanukovych, the interconfessional dialog 
launched by Mr. Yushchenko has taken on new features, although the first 
point on its agenda remains unchanged: the split between the Kyiv and Moscow 
Patriarchates. The urgency of this issue on both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian 
border was underscored by the fact that Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All-Rus, 
has visited Ukraine three times since his election in 2009.
His Holiness’s intention of subordinating Ukrainian Orthodoxy to the Moscow 
Patriarchate fits smoothly in with the latest integrational trends in relations be-
tween the two countries. Moreover, a personal aspect has been added to state 
affairs. On one hand, President Yanukovych and Patriarch Kirill have a long and 
close relationship. On the other, analysts say that Russia’s political leadership 
is not enamored with the very independent, active and public role of the head 
of the Russian Orthodox Church. This adds a political tinge to the battle for 
Ukraine’s flocks, not only in Kyiv, but also in Moscow.
Local elections revert
to the mixed system
The new law 
works against the 
government’s rivals
The battle for 
Ukraine’s faithful 
becomes politicized
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Customs Union, WTO and EU FTA
Integration – a historical reality
Integration has been a process involving all times and all peoples. As soon as 
the earliest states emerged, they began to interact and therefore to integrate. 
From the point of view of goals, war and trade have really been mere instru-
ments of integration.
The history of humanity is a history of empires. The First and Second World 
Wars, the collapse of the colonial empires, the Soviet and European Unions—
these are only some of the most significant examples of integrational processes 
on a global scale in the last century. They resulted in a shift from traditional 
models of relations between independent nation states—colonies or metropo-
lises—towards the creation of superstates as the foci of competing integrational 
unions.
The current and future spheres of influence of such superstates have been de-
fined by students of geopolitical trends long ago. Ukrainian analysts look only 
at two possible options for Ukraine: Russia or the EU. Moreover, the country 
can only passively select to join itself to one of the two for the simple reason that 
Ukraine itself cannot become an empire.
Meanwhile in the West, at least two well-known international thinkers, Jacques 
Chrétien and Zbigniew Brzezinski, were talking about the key integrational 
role of Ukraine, regardless of the countries desires and understanding. Ukraine 
finds itself right between two integrational centers. Although the country itself 
has no superstate ambitions, Mr. Chrétien declared that Ukraine would deter-
mine the shape of the Eurasian region in 30 years: a Chinese hegemony at the 
borders of Europe or a powerful Euroatlantic democratic society that stretches 
to the borders of China. 1
Zbigniew Brzezinski stated that any new Eurasian union of states that develops 
around Russia without an independent Ukraine, will inevitably become less Eu-
ropean and more Asiatic with every passing year.” 2
1 Speech by J. Chrétien at the first YES Summit.
2 The Grand Chessboard by Z. Brzezinski, 1997.
Topic of the Month
Ukraine’s 
integrational role 
is decisive
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Active trade agreements, 
based on eff ective date and status
Source: www.wto.org 
Source: The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements by Jo-Ann 
Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, WTO Discussion Paper №8, 2005
For many centuries, history reveals mutual integration processes that have be-
come particularly intense in the 20th and 21st centuries. This has helped work 
out workable integrational principles and mechanisms that allow a balance of 
interests and influence to be kept among different members of an integrated as-
sociation. The EU is a classic example of this kind of “principled” integration.
Enormous historical experience is the best argument in favor of a determined 
adherence to European principles. These are a guarantee of stability in an inte-
grated association and of the ability of such a union to withstand both external 
and internal challenges. Conversely, violating these principles carries serious 
The principles 
underlying the EU 
maintain a balance 
of interests
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threats for all sides. These include international conflicts and civil wars, social 
chaos and dictatorships.
These threats become even more serious during a period of economic decline. 
According to some studies, a sharp fall of over 15% of GDP in any country leads 
to uncontrollable social processes and can easily result in a popular explosion. 
Historical examples abound: the coming of the Nazis to power in Germany, 
the Russian Revolution, the collapse of Yugoslavia, and so on. Clearly, Ukraine 
demonstrates a sufficiently hopeful signs of economic revival that, for now, 
make such events extremely unlikely. Still, unresolved structural problems 
coupled with a difficult economic situation in Europe make it hard to talk about 
the economic crisis in the past tense.
Customs Union, Russian-style
Russia continues to play its traditional role as the driver of integrational pro-
cesses in the post-soviet region, a process that has been referred to as “collect-
ing land.” In July 2010, Russia moved one more step in the direction by launch-
ing a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus.
It would seem that the classic name of this integrational institution, whose defi-
nition can be found in every textbook in international economics, leaves little 
room for creative maneuvering by its founders. According to WTO rules, a cus-
toms union is a single customs territory that involves canceling all customs du-
ties and restrictions among the member countries, instituting a single customs 
tariff for goods from third countries, and carrying out a common foreign trade 
policy.
On paper, at least, the members of this new Customs Union show that they un-
derstand these points. But the agreed conditions under which this new integrat-
ed entity will function contain such a large number of exceptions and unregu-
lated issues that it remains a customs union in name alone. According to the 
signed documents, there are more than 400 exceptions to the free movement 
of goods. Moreover, customs control will be maintained at the borders of the 
member countries as well as non-tariff trade barriers such as quotas and subsi-
dies. Among others, Russia is maintaining its export duty on oil and oil products 
to Belarus, while Belarus is holding onto its export duty on transporting Russian 
oil across its territory.
Nor does the newly-formed Customs Union require the members to uphold a 
single customs policy. Typically, issues regarding the use of trade protection in-
struments are supposed to be raised before a single authorized national agency 
set up for this very purpose, in order to coordinate a common customs policy. 
In the case of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, however, their various Govern-
ments have the last word.
A 15% decline 
in GDP will lead 
to uncontrollable 
social processes
Russia continues
to “collect land”
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In short, the Customs Union between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus cannot 
rightly claim to be one, as it does not correspond to the basic elements and prin-
ciples for such a union. Moreover, the new integration project is not even a free 
trade area, the simplest form of integration there is, as it does not in fact do away 
with internal duties and tariffs on imported goods.
Interestingly, even the initiators of this project have admitted as much. After 
all, Premier Putin has announced several times that canceling all restrictions 
on trade with Russia, that is, a proper Free Trade Area, will only be possible if 
there is an economic union. According to the classical logic of integrational 
processes, this is the same as defending a PhD thesis, not just without a degree 
but without even finishing school.
The concepts of “free trade area,” “customs union,” and “single economic re-
gion” in this context lose all economic meaning. The Customs Union in Mos-
cow’s way of thinking has two main features that reveal its essentially political 
nature.
Firstly, Russia has the controlling stake in this 170-million Eurasian expanse. 
The distribution of votes in this supra-national body called the Customs Union 
Commission is such that Russia has 57% while Kazakhstan and Belarus have 
only 21.5% each. All decisions are made based on a two-thirds majority vote, 
which means that Russia can always block any decision it chooses.
Disputed issues are supposed to be reviewed by higher bodies of the Customs 
Union: interstate councils of Heads of Government and Heads of State, where 
all decisions are consensual. Still, if Moscow succeeded in persuading Minsk 
and Astana to agree to these conditions of operation in the new integrational 
entity, nothing will stop it from further ensuring that its partners in the union 
will agree to the “necessary” decisions.
Even more obvious is the scheme for distributing customs duties within the 
Union, which, incidentally, constitute a significant part of State Budget reve-
nues for all three countries. So far, Russia and Kazakhstan have agreed to di-
vide the revenues so that 86.5% go to Russia, 8.5% to Kazakhstan, and 5.0% to 
Belarus. Belarus’s dissent and its attempts to cut a deal for an additional 0.3% of 
duties looks more like agreeing the terms of capitulation and not like coopera-
tion among equals.
Incidentally, similar principles of hegemony in the distribution of votes oper-
ated in all previous integrational project launched by Moscow in the post-soviet 
Eurasian region. For instance, EAEA, the Eurasian Economic Association within 
which the Customs Union operates, distributes votes on the basis of 40% to Rus-
sia, 15% each to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and 7.5% each to Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan. Decisions are traditionally made on a two-thirds majority 
basis, that is, 66% of the vote. Again, no decisions can be made without Mos-
cow’s concurrence.
Russia’s new 
Customs Union 
cannot rightly claim 
to be one
Russia has 
the controlling stake 
in this Customs Union
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The second peculiarity of a Russian-style Customs Union is the exceptionally 
“flexible” way in which its principles are applied. For instance, member coun-
tries can maintain trade barriers for their most significant commodities, such as 
fuels.
The concept of integration whose forced realization Ukrainians are currently 
watching with bated breath has been percolating in the brains of Russia’s lead-
ership for many a year. Recent events have been merely the latest attempt at 
reviving the integrational dinosaur that has been peacefully sleeping its papery 
sleep from the time it first arrived in the world in faraway 1995. That was the 
year Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia signed an agreement to form 
a Customs Union.
In time, this virtual project changed shape more than once, evolving first into 
the EAEA in 2000 and then into the UES in 2003. But new names failed to bring 
these initiatives to life. They continued to exist mostly as reminders of the fact 
that Russia retains for itself the role of integrational center in this region, rather 
than as functioning mechanisms for true regional cooperation.
Russia’s integrational initiatives
Date of founding Name Membership Ukraine’s role
December 1991 CIS Armenia,
Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, 
Georgia,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, 
Russia, 
Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan
Founding member 
and participating 
state, but not 
member 
Did not sign CIS 
statutes
September 1993 Economic Union 
(ЕU) 
Armenia,
Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, 
Georgia,
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, 
Russia, 
Tajikistan, 
Ukraine, 
Uzbekistan
Associated 
member
Did not sign 
founding 
Agreement
January 1995 Customs Union 
(CU)
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia
Not a member
The Agreement 
on a Customs Union 
was fi rst signed 
in 1995
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Date of founding Name Membership Ukraine’s role
October 2000 Eurasian Economic 
Association (EAEA)
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, 
Tajikistan
Observer status
September 2003 Unifi ed Economic 
Space (UES)
Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, 
Russia, 
Ukraine
Participates with 
reservation
Ukraine needs no phony choices
Moscow has made it be known to Kyiv that the about-face in relations with Rus-
sia that President Yanukovych was so keen to establish leads to the Customs 
Union. The rules of courtesy demand that the open invitation issued by Premier 
Vladimir Putin be offered an equally open answer. However, following the rules 
of diplomacy, official Kyiv is in no hurry to dot its i’s.
On 13 February 2010, the newly-elected President of Ukraine announced that 
he was positive about the idea of joining a Customs Union with Russia.3 Yet 
barely two and a half months later, at a PACE session on 27 April, Mr. Yanuk-
ovych declared: “Joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakh-
stan is impossible today.”4
As Deputy Chair of the VR Foreign Affairs Committee Leonid Kozhara explains: 
“Ukraine could join the Customs Union on the basis of multi-speed integration… 
Ukraine could integrate into the Customs Union at a different pace and on a 
different basis from Kazakhstan and Belarus.”5 Deputy Premier Serhiy Tihipko 
adds: “Russia and Ukraine will return to the question of a customs Union just as 
soon as Russia joins the WTO and Ukraine gets its Association Agreement.”6
The dilemma that is causing Ukrainian officials some concern is that the coun-
try cannot simultaneously join a Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Ka-
zakhstan and set up a Free Trade Area with the European Union. The EU posi-
tion was clearly presented by Eurocommissioner Hugh Mingarelli:7 “If Ukraine 
feels it must join this Customs Union, it will become extremely difficult to set up 
a Free Trade Area with the EU.”
Indeed, regardless of how nominal the name “customs union” is for this joint in-
tegration project by Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, Ukraine’s active involve-
3 According to the Forum information service.
4 According to UNIAN, a news agency.
5 According to Ukrinform, a news agency. See http://project.ukrinform.ua/news/
16580/
6 According to wto.in.ua.
7 Deputy General Director at DG External Relations for ENP.
Joining the CU 
would make 
it impossible 
to set up an FTA 
with the EU...
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ment will undoubtedly put an end to the country’s Eurointegration ambitions, 
even in such modest instances as a Free Trade Area with the EU. After all, form-
ing a Customs Union means that Ukraine will join the common external tariffs 
of three countries with whom the EU has barely liberalized trade.
What’s more, joining the Customs Union also violates Ukraine’s commitments 
as a member of the WTO. The rules of this trade organization require that the 
level of protection of markets in a customs union not be higher than the level of 
protection in the countries that have initiated it. This means that the common 
tariff in the CU cannot be higher than those conditions under which Ukraine 
joined the WTO. Such a situation is highly unlikely, given that at this time the 
customs tariffs collected by the new Union are 92% Russian customs duties. 
Assessments of the costs and benefits of joining differ. Russian analysts8 cal-
culate that joining the Union will bring Ukraine 3–5% more annual growth in 
GDP. By contrast, former Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk9 says that Ukraine’s 
State Budget will lose US $1 billion a year in revenues from customs duties not 
received. Undoubtedly, both points of view have some basis in reality. However, 
the terms for distributing customs duties among members of the Union and the 
fact that income from them is the lion’s share of revenues in Ukraine’s State Bud-
get will force a more cautious position towards this integrational proposition.
The dominant paradigm in Ukraine’s foreign policy is that, sooner or later, the 
country will have to choose between the EU and Russia. Given this mistaken no-
tion, the more active work of the Ukrainian Government in the Russian integra-
tion arena automatically slows movement towards the European Union.
Despite the President’s optimistic announcements about signing an Associa-
tion Agreement by the end of this year, the prospects of Ukraine’s joining a Free 
Trade Area with the EU are becoming ever more clouded. Negotiations stalled 
the minute talk switched from discusing general issues to agreeing concrete 
commitments. Lobbyists are spurring Ukraine’s negotiators not to concede a 
single point under cover of national interests. At this point, the positions that 
remain unresolved include: 
The geographic identification of product origins: Ukraine defends • 
Sovetskoye “champagne” and Zakarpattia “cognac” as though they were 
national inventions, although everyone knows quite well that this is a hope-
less confrontation;
Agriculture, sanitary and phyto-sanitary norms: These remain Ukraine’s • 
weakest point in the negotiation process and therefore this area needs the 
greatest changes;
8 Data based on a presentation by Kirill Dmitriev, president of Icon Private Equity, a 
fund, at a public hearing organized by the Effective Management Fund.
9 Interview with V. Pynzenyk in Ukrainska Pravda. See http://www.pravda.com.ua/
articles/2010/04/2/4904589/
…and violates 
WTO rules
Many Ukrainians 
falsely believe 
that the inevitable 
choice is Russia 
or the EU
FTA talks with 
the EU have 
stalled
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Duty rates: As a classic example, Ukraine wants to protect its non-existent • 
domestic car industry, possibly as a cultural-ethnic heritage;
State procurements: Like its predecessors, the latest Law also fails to meet • 
basic EU requirements.
From colonization to integration
An examination of the principles that lie at the foundation of the Customs Union 
between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus and the conditions under which it op-
erates offers a basis for stating that this is not a customs union but a different 
instrument altogether. A sample of the principles on which colonial policy was 
developed in the 18-19th centuries by European states includes:
Streamlining trade routes and markets and eliminating intermediaries;• 
Ensuring trade by unifying the legal arena and trade policy;• 
Gaining access to cheap labor for physically hard, demeaning work;• 
Testing and working out new ways and means of managing;• 
Intervening in local conflicts and using armed forces for the purpose in order • 
to keep the army battle-ready;
Expanding the reach of the Russian language and culture;• 
Acquiring and exploiting economic assets;• 
Forcing international agreements and arrangements regarding unified poli-• 
cies, concessions, leases, and so on.
When looked at from the position of “colony-metropolis,” it becomes obvious 
what type of relations Russia is building in the countries that belong to its sphere 
of influence. And it has growing confirmation that Ukraine is among these.
Still, an aggressive integrator is not necessarily a successful integrator. Alex-
ander the Great, Genghis Khan, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, and Josef 
Stalin all had grandiose visions of integration by conquest. Still, none of them 
lasted much beyond the lifetime of their initiator.
Trade integration is a much more long-lasting and convenient approach for 
most countries. The best confirmation of this is sustained presence of the British 
Commonwealth, which continues to include most of the former colonies of the 
British Empire, all of whom have become strong, independent nations.
The Customs 
Union is not 
an instrument 
for economic 
integration
Russia 
is establishing 
colonial 
relations 
in the post-
soviet region
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Moreover, colonial empires mostly collapsed half a century ago. The reason for 
this was that, in a modern, globalized world, colonial relations are ineffective, 
both for the colony, which loses the ability to independently develop and freely 
make use of its own resources, as for the “metropolis,” which, in time, finds itself 
forced to direct more and more resources at maintaining peace and order in its 
colonies than it actually gains from them. The result is an inevitable collapse 
of the colonial empire, which carries the risk of social upheaval and conflict for 
both sides.
This has been obvious to European countries for some time already, as they 
build mutual relations based on a balance of interests. Today, the European 
Union is the only real international union that has gone through all the stages 
of integration, from free trade area to monetary union, and that continues to 
move forward.
The reason for this success and longevity is undoubtedly the way the rules of 
integration have been upheld, when the terms “free trade zone” and “customs 
union” have clear economic meanings and do not turn into political projects. 
Conversely, any talk of Ukraine’s further integration in the post-soviet arena 
should take place not on the basis of horse-trading for preferential fuel prices 
but on the basis of European integrational principles. Before beginning discus-
sions about forming a customs union, there should be a proper free trade area 
that, among others, conflicts with neither WTO rules nor Ukraine’s Eurointe-
gration ambitions.
Ukraine’s leadership understands perfectly well, what is really going on with 
integrational processes in the country. It is not a question of the capacity of 
Ukrainians: The Government has all the necessary organizational, intellectual 
and decision-making qualities. The question is more how aware they are of the 
cost of inaction and the ruinous long-term consequences, for all participants. 
Kyiv’s relapse into a hypnotic state induced by Moscow’s snake-charms is turn-
ing into subordination to an unknown and currently non-existent center. From 
this point of view, the role of willing sacrifice to integration Russian-style that 
the opposition has eagerly taken upon itself, is hardly better than the position 
of passive ally placed upon the government.
The motives for integration hidden within an unreal customs union are, firstly, 
Russia’s problem and not Ukraine’s. The illusion of immediate benefits for all 
the countries that have chosen such short and deceptive pathways to integration 
bode little good. Ukraine has all the leverage it needs to establish high-quali-
ty integration with Russia. Taking a pro-active position, naming things what 
they are, and consistently planning and carrying out all the necessary steps will 
bring both sides the most benefits. Bringing Russia closer to the EU and the US 
is possible only if regional integration follows Euroatlantic principles.
In the modern 
world, colonial 
relations no 
longer work
The EU is the only 
union that has gone 
through all stages 
of integration
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Through sheer inertia, Russia is going down the path of European countries in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, setting up delayed-response mines along all of its 
own borders: Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Right now Mos-
cow is stubbornly working to set the biggest mine of all, Ukraine. If Ukraine 
explodes, Russia will have a very hard time surviving.
Russia is the biggest integrational center in the Eurasian region and has em-
bodied this particular mission for several centuries. Still, times change and what 
worked once upon a time can be very destructive today.
Russia has the strategic capacity to plan and carry out its plans. It has balanced 
relations with key central powers and it belongs to the largest integrational as-
sociations in the world—the G8, G20 and SCO. But Russia’s Achilles’ heel is its 
unreformed system of government and this is playing a decisive role today in 
integrational processes that are following a double standard. Right now, Russia 
has a unique opportunity to develop a new integrational platform with Ukraine, 
following modern European principles.
Inside Ukraine is published by the International Centre for Policy Studies (ICPS) as part of its project implemented under the 
Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) program, which is funded by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and implemented by Pact Ukraine. This information product is made possible by the generous support of 
the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of the publication 
are the responsibility of ICPS, and do not necessarily refl ect the views of USAID, Pact Inc. or the United States Government.
Russia will not 
survive an explosive 
Ukraine
